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Abstract
Formal models could accurately reflect design of systems and can be used to implement automatic verification and
validation, however, two main problems exit when modeling the system failure behavior: firstly, it’s a huge job to
model directly using the Altarica language (i.e. Altarica Data-Flow). Secondly, models described in Altarica codes
lack visualization, and it’s visually inconvenient for reviewers to verify the correctness of Altarica models and the
inconsistency between the Altarica codes and the real design. To solve these problems, a graphical modeling method
is proposed to describe the system failure behavior in this paper. Meanwhile, in order to obtain Altarica models that
could be used to take automatic safety analysis, the translation method from graphical failure behavior models to
Altarica models is also recommended in this paper.
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Since formal models could accurately reflect design of systems and can be used to implement
automatic verification and validation, model-based safety analysis (MBSA) methods have been widely
implemented on safety-critical systems of different areas such as aviation. Recently, Altarica-based safety
analysis has become the most representative and popular MBSA method, which has been adopted by lots
of aircraft companies such as Boeing, Airbus.
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Altarica models failure behaviour of systems, which means that it could describe how failure modes
propagate among the inside components. However, two main problems exit when modelling the system
failure behaviour: firstly, it’s a huge job to model directly using the Altarica language (i.e.  Altarica Data-
Flow). With the increasing scale of systems, code lines of Altarica would take an explosive growth which
means that it is a large burden and error-prone to model for safety analysts. Secondly, models described in
Altarica codes lack visualization, and it’s visually inconvenient for reviewers to verify the correctness of
Altarica models and the inconsistency between the Altarica codes and the real design. To solve the
problems above, a graphical modelling method is proposed to describe the system failure behaviour in
this paper, which means that it would be quite easier to build failure behaviour models through simple
drawing actions. Meanwhile, in order to obtain Altarica models that could be used to take automatic
safety analysis, the translation method from graphical failure behaviour models to Altarica models is also
recommended in this paper. Thus, the inconvenient and error-prone Altarica-modeling process would be
simplified and a more visualized model is presented.
In this paper, how to graphically describe system failure behaviour is firstly specified, including how
to describe the system structure and failure propagation. System structure information contains
hierarchical architectures, composing components and relationships between components. System failure
behaviour information contains basic failure information of components (i.e. input failure modes, output
failure modes and triggers, output failure modes), mode transition and failure logic relations (i.e. the logic
relation among output failure modes, input failure modes and inside failure modes of component itself).
Then, translation from graphical models into Altarica is specified, i.e. how to translate the system
structure information and failure propagation information into different clauses of Altarica (such as the
flow clause, the state clause, the assert clause, etc). According to the work above, Altarica models
describe by Altarica Data-flow could be built in a graphical way.
The graphical modeling of system failure behaviour and its translating into Altarica would provide a
theoretical basis for developing graphical modeling tools with Altarica. Graphical modeling would supply
great convenience for safety analysts to build Altarica models and eliminate human errors brought into
the models, which could promote the engineering application of Altarica models.
This paper is organized as follows:
1) First, the context of this paper is described in Chapter 1.
2) Then, the theoretical foundation is described in Chapter 2, including the grammars of Altarica
data flow language and the way how Altaica data flow could be used to describe system failure
behaviour.
3) The 3rd chapter details how to graphically model system failure behaviour and how to translate
the graphs into Altarical data-flow models.
4) Finally, the feasibility of graphical modelling of failure behaviour and translating it into Altaica
is verified through a case study of an actual system.
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2. Theory of Graphical modeling and Altarica
Altarica models on failure logic [1], which means that Altarica could explicitly describe the
propagation of the effects of failure modes. In this chapter, failure logic modeling approach is introduced
first, and then the basic concepts of Altarica are described.
2.1. Graphical modeling
The failure logic modeling (FLM) approach emerged in the 1990s. FLM comes from traditional safety
analysis method such as FTA and FMEAˈbut it overcomes the problems of great difficulty to modify ,
reuse and application to large systems. A component’s failure logic describes how deviations of
component inputs (input failure modes) combine with each other and with internal abnormal phenomena
(internal failures) to cause particular deviations of behavior of component outputs (output failure
modes).The system’s FL are composed from the FL of individual components [5]. Altarica models belong
to FLM as well as FPTN[6]ǃFPTC[7]ǃHip-Hops[8],etc.
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Fig. 1 Simplified FPTN graph
FPTN is a graphical notation of failure logic. Even Though FPTN is not a formal method, it could
describe failure logic very directly and clearly though its graphical languages [6]. FPTN is simplified in
this paper as shown in Fig. 2 (only generic characters kept). Modules are represented by a box. Variables
on the left of the box in Fig 2 stand for input failure modes (i.e. A and B), and variables on the right are
output failure modes (i.e. X). Internal failure modes (i.e. C) and relations between input, internal and
output failure modes are describe inside the box.
According to connectives in the design models, a failure logic model of the system can be composed
from the characterizations of individual components by connecting output failure modes of the component
to input failure modes of other components, as shown in Fig. 3. Boxes in FPTN can be seen a set of fault
trees. Causes of output failure modes (such as Z in Fig. 3) can be deduced through the FPTN graphs and
fault trees could be built in that way.
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Fig. 2 FPTN notion of a System
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2.2. Altarica Model
Altarica is a formal language developed by the computer science laboratory of Bordeaux jointly with
industries partners [9], and has been widely used in the aviation areas. In the Altarica models, systems are
described by a set of nodes. A node is a hierarchical description, which could be composed of sub-nodes.
Nodes that contain no sub-nodes could be used to represent a component which cannot be decomposed.
Nodes containing sub-nodes could represent a system. The way to describe component nodes and system
nodes is introduced as follows [10] [11].
Each component node is defined by three well identified parts. First part is the declaration of different
kinds of node parameters which are state, flow and event. States are internal variables that memorize
current functioning modes (failure modes or normal ones). Flows are node inputs or outputs. Events are
phenomena that could trigger transitions of states. Pilot actions, the occurrence of failures, or
deterministic reactions to input conditions all could be seen as events.
The second part describes the automaton transitions. First of all, the values of initial states are assigned
in the init clause. Then, the transition is described by a tuple like “g| í evtí > e” where g is the guard of
the transition, evt is an event name and e is the effect of the transition. The guard is a Boolean formula
over states or flows variables. It defines the configuration in which the transition is reachable if the event
evt occurs. The effect e is a list of assignations of value to state variables. So the transition part describes
how functioning or failure states can evolve. Finally, the distributions of event durations are described in
the clause extern of nodes.
The third part is a set of assertions described in the “assert” clause. Assertions are atomic equalities or
more structured equations using case constructions. They establish invariant relations between the states
and the flows of the component and so, describe how component outputs are determined by component
inputs and current functioning mode.
3. Graphical modeling method and it’s translation to Altarica
3.1. Safety and reliability
Reliability is about if the product will correctly implement its function in specific time, environment. In
contrast, safety is about those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational, illness, damage to or
loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. So safety focus more on the consequence of
the failure, which caused directly by something externally visible reason like “can’t provide function” or
“abnormal function”, not something like hardware failure that can’t be seen by people directly, so when
we conduct safety analysis we do not analysis the consequence of hardware failure directly, but analysis
the consequence of functional failure, and analysis which hardware failure could lead to functional failure.
In comparison, the reliability is more concerned about whether the system will fail, that is to say we carry
out reliability work is to analyze which hardware has failed and the causes. So by carrying out safety work
we can find those functional failures that affect the safety of the system, then these undesirable functional
failures are as an input of reliability analyze.
3.2. Failure mode and the failure propagation
FMEA and FTA are two typical reliability and safety analysis methods. In carrying out the system
failure mode and effect analysis, we need to analyze system hardware failure mode and functional failure
modes of equipment, components, parts from bottom to the top and its influence. In the conduct fault tree
analysis, we need to choose the undesirable events as the top event, and analysis of the causes of the top
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event top-down, until the underlying hardware failure modes. There exists a certain relationship between
these two methods, one is from the underlying hardware or functional failure to undesired events (failure
effect), and the other is from an undesirable event to the underlying hardware failures. Therefore, we can
do some depth study about the relationship of unexpected events, hardware failure, functional failure to
examine how failures transfer within the system, equipment, components and parts in order do some
abstraction about system failure mode (hardware failure and functional failure) and their relationship, and
then represent the failure and the relationship with the graphical method.
We first select parts as the study case. For the simplest parts, its failure mode includes hardware failure
modes and functional failure mode. Functional failure mode mainly include: “can’t provide output”,
“provide abnormal output” or “provide an error output”, hardware failure mode may be: “hardware
burned”, “hardware breakage”. By comparing these two types of failure modes we can found that
functional failure mode is mainly reflected in the output to external devices, and hardware failure mode is
mainly reflected in the hardware itself incomplete. For multiple parts, the relationship between each
device is actually a transfer of function but not only the link between the hardware, the dynamic
characteristic between parts is mainly reflected by the transfer of function between multiple parts, so in
order to study the dynamic behavior of the system, more needs to be concerned about the transfer of
function between different parts, rather than hardware relationship. By analyzing the causes of functional
failure, we can find that there are two main causes, one is its own hardware failure, and the other is the
input failure which comes from the other parts, that is to say parts functional is caused by hardware failure
of parts itself and functional failure of external input parts.
Then we select equipment or components as the research object which is much higher integrated than
parts. For slightly more complex equipments or components, we can also find that its failure mode
includes hardware failure modes and functional failure mode. Functional failure mode mainly include:
“can’t provide output”, “provide abnormal output” or “provide an error output”, hardware failure mode
may be the breakdown of parts which composed of the equipment or component. By analyzing the causes
of functional failure, we can find that there are two main causes, one is hardware failure of one parts or a
combination of multiple parts, and the other is the input failure which comes from the other equipment or
component, that is to say equipment or component functional failure is caused by hardware failure of
internal parts itself and functional failure of external input equipment or component.
For complex systems, it is composed by multiple equipments or components. Thus, compared to the
parts, equipment or components, the system is just a higher integration product, the relationships between
functional failures and hardware failures of the system are similar to the relationship of equipment,
component and parts. That is to say, functional failure of the system is caused by internal hardware failure
and functional failure of external input.
So through the research of safety and reliability, and the relationship between functional failure and
hardware failure of system, equipment, component and parts, here by we can assume the topmost
functional failure as a top event, then the minimum level of hardware failure as the basic reason, use
functional failure to connect hardware failures of equipment, components and parts in order to form a
network of relationships of the whole system, as the basement of subsequent failure cause analysis.
3.3. Graphical modeling of failure and failure propagation
Regardless of the system, equipment or components, when designing the product there has to be some
corresponding requirements, including: functional requirements and non-functional requirements, and
through a series of design and verification work to ensure that products meet their functional and non-
functional requirements, so it can be said that each product has the function, regardless of product size and
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how the form is. Since all products have the corresponding function, they have to face the appropriate
users, including: Other products, people and the environment. There exist input-output relationships
between products and users. Therefore, this part of the work will abstract system, equipment, component,
parts as a module, which has inputs and outputs. Next we will study how to add failure mode to this
module and how to represent transitive relationship failure on this module.
FPTN itself is a graphical representation of the fault logic, and its most basic elements of graphical
modeling such as inputs, outputs, modules, logic are similar to the failure modes, failure mode
propagation discussed in 3.2 and the functional feature of product discussed in 3.3, so, the paper select
FPTN as basis of graphical depiction of system failure behavior, and transfer graphical model to
ALTARICA model to conduct safety and reliability analysis. In order to combining FPTN and specific
safety and reliability analysis work, we need to build the relationship between hardware failure modes,
functional failure modes , failure mode propagation and input, output, modules, logic in FPTN, and make
some improvements if necessary.
When we do graphical modeling, the following distinction needs to be known:
z Physical Module: For the physical objects of the system, such as equipment, we need to according
to functional failure mode of its input and output, the object's hardware failure modes and
functional failure modes to build the physical module;
z Functional modules: For the high level function composed by multiple sub-functions, we need to
according to the relationship between the functional failure modes to build the functional module.
Based on the simplified FPTN model in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows the method of how to represent
physical module in a graphical way.
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Fig. 3 Physical module in a graphical way
Based on the simplified FPTN model in Figure 2, Figure 4 shows the method of how to represent
functional module in a graphical way.
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Fig. 4 Functional module in a graphical way
For a complex system composed by multiple devices, Figure 5 shows the method of how to represent
integrated module in a graphical way.
0RGXOH&
$))0
%))0
&))0
&))0  ᧤$))0$1'%))0᧥
25&+)0
&+)0
0RGXOH'
'))0
'))0  '+)0
'+)0
)XQFWLRQ(
())0
())0  ᧤&))025'))0᧥
Fig. 5 Integrated module in a graphical way
3.4. Translate Graphical model to Altarica
Research in 3.3 shows that the most basic element of graphical modeling is the input, output, modules,
logic, and the relationship between these basic elements and failure mode is that: the input and output
corresponds to functional failure mode, the module corresponds to function or physical object, logical
corresponds to the relationship of input functional failure, output functional failure mode and hardware
failure modes. Therefore, this part of the work is to describe how to use Altarica language to describe the
graphical model’s basic elements, include: input, output, modules and logic.
Altarica language characteristics as described in 2.2, we can find that the relationships between
graphical model and Altarica language correspondence are as follows:
z Node: represents functional module and physical module;
z State: represents failure mode of hardware and function;
z Flow: represents input and output of the module;
z Trans: represents the state of hardware failure mode and the initial state;
z Event: represents the transition between fail and nominal state of  hardware;
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z Assert: represents the relationship between input functional failure mode and hardware and
functional failure mode of the module.
Based on the graphical model shown in figure 4, we translate the graphical model into Altarica as
below:
node Module_C
  flow
    Module_A_FFM: default_nominal_failed : in;
   Module_B_FFM: default_nominal_failed : in;
    Module_C_FFM: efault_nominal_failed : out;
state
    Module_C_HFM : {nominal,failed} ;
event  fail_Module_C_HFM_nominal_failed,rep_Module_C_HFM_failed_nominal;
    init Module_C_HFM := nominal;
trans
    ((Module_C_HFM=nominal))|-fail_Module_C_HFM_nominal_failed-> Module_C_HFM := failed;
  ((Module_C_HFM=failed))|-rep_Module_C_HFM_failed_nominal-> Module_C_HFM := nominal;
assert
Module_C_FFM=if((((Module_A_FFM=failed)and (Module_B_FFM=failed)) or
(Module_C_HFM=failed))) then failed else nominal;
edon
4. Study Case
The following will be XX typical control system as an example, gives a graphical representation, and
the corresponding Altarica code.
XX control system mainly consists of three parts, namely, sensors, computers, actuators, and its
function is as follows:
z Sensor: the speed, altitude, temperature sensing, etc., and passes the data to the computer for
calculation of the control command;
z Computer: the various data given in the sensor and the actuator position feedback data, given the
actuation command;
z Actuator: According to the computer instruction given to the rudder actuator provides for power
and feedback of its actuation position information.
In order to simplify the model, failure modes are simplified as follows:
z Failure mode: can’t provide output;
z Hardware failure mode: failure;
In addition, in order to represent the system dynamic feature, describe the conversion from normal to
abnormal state, therefore we need to define a normal state.
So for the hardware, it has the following two modes:
z Normal;
z Failed;
For the function, it has the following two modes:
z Normal;
z Can’t provide output;
4.1. Graphical model of XX control system
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According to the system description above, the graphical model we build is as follow:
Fig. 7 Graphical model of XX control system
4.2. Altarica model from graphical model of XX control system
  According to the graphical model built above, the Altarica code are as follow:
node Actuator
  flow
    Computer_FFM : default_nominal_failed : in;
    Actuator_Power_FFM: default_nominal_failed : out;
    Actuator_Position_FFM: default_nominal_failed : out;
  state
   Actuator_HFM: {nominal,Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed,Actuator_HFM___Crashed} ;
  event  
fail_Actuator_HFM_nominal_Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed,rep_Actuator_HFM_Actuator_
HFM___SensorFailed_nominal,fail_Actuator_HFM_nominal_Actuator_HFM___Crashed,rep_
Actuator_HFM_Actuator_HFM___Crashed_nominal;
  init
Actuator_HFM := nominal;
trans
((Actuator_HFM=nominal))|-fail_Actuator_HFM_nominal_Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed-
>Actuator_HFM:= Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed;
((Actuator_HFM=Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed))|-
rep_Actuator_HFM_Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed_nominal-> Actuator_HFM := nominal;
((Actuator_HFM=nominal))|- fail_Actuator_HFM_nominal_Actuator_HFM___Crashed-
>Actuator_HFM:= Actuator_HFM___Crashed;
((Actuator_HFM=ctuator_HFM___Crashed))|-
rep_Actuator_HFM_Actuator_HFM___Crashed_nominal -> Actuator_HFM := nominal;
assert
Actuator_Power_FFM=if(((Actuator_HFM=Actuator_HFM___Crashed)or
(Computer_FFM=failed))) then failed else nominal;
Actuator_Position=if ((Actuator_HFM=Actuator_HFM___SensorFailed)) then failed else
nominal;
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edon
node Computer
flow
Sensor_FFM: efault_nominal_failed : in;
Actuator_Position: default_nominal_failed : in;
Computer_FFM: default_nominal_failed : out;
state
Computer_HFM : {nominal,failed} ;
event  fail_Computer_HFM_nominal_failed,rep_Computer_HFM_failed_nominal;
init
Computer_HFM := nominal;
trans
((Computer_HFM=nominal))|- fail_Computer_HFM_nominal_failed-> Computer_HFM :=
failed;
((Computer_HFM=failed))|- rep_Computer_HFM_failed_nominal-> Computer_HFM :=
nominal;
assert
Computer_FFM=if((((Sensor_FFM=failed)and(Computer_HFM=failed))or
((Actuator_Position_FFM=failed)and (Computer_HFM=failed)))) then failed else nominal;
edon
node Sensor
flow
Sensor_FFM: default_nominal_failed : out;
state
Sensor_HFM : {nominal,failed} ;
event
fail_Sensor_HFM_nominal_failed,rep_Sensor_HFM_failed_nominal;
init
Sensor_HFM := nominal;
trans
((Sensor_HFM = nominal))|- fail_Sensor_HFM_nominal_failed-> Sensor_HFM := failed;
((Sensor_HFM=failed))|- rep_Sensor_HFM_failed_nominal-> Sensor_HFM := nominal;
assert
Sensor_FFM=if ((Sensor_HFM=failed)) then failed else nominal;
edon
5. Conclusion
By abstracting safety-related elements, studying the system failure behavior and the method of
graphical modeling and the way of translating graphical model to Altarica language, and use simple
system to demonstrate feasibility of the method, this article provides an idea for the subsequent use of
formal automated analysis tools in the field of safety analysis.
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